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Abstract 
 
For many in Latin America, the increasing participation of China and India in 
international markets is seen as a looming shadow of two ‘mighty giants’ on the 
region’s manufacturing sector. Are they really mighty giants when it comes to their 
impact on manufacturing employment? This paper attempts to answer this question 
estimating the effects of trade with China and India on Argentina’s industrial 
employment. We use a dynamic econometric model and industry level data to 
estimate the effects of trade with China and India on the level of employment in 
Argentina’s manufacturing sector. Results suggest that trade with China and India 
only had a small negative effect on industrial employment, even in a period of swift 
trade liberalization like the nineties. 
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“China and India are seen by many as two mighty giants 
threatening the jobs of the manufacturing industry” 
La Nación Newspaper, Buenos Aires 
March 2005  
 
“[We] must not repeat the mistakes of the nineties, when an 
‘invasion’ of Chinese products destroyed entire sectors of our 
industry […]” 
Communiqué of CAME  
(Medium Enterprises Association of Argentina) 
6 April 2004 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
For many in Latin America, the increasing participation of China and India in 
international markets is seen as a looming shadow of two ‘mighty giants’ on the 
region’s industrial sector, and one of the major causes behind the significant reduction 
of employment in the manufacturing industry in the last decade. Are these claims 
justified? Are China and India, the ‘mighty giants’ driving the secular fall in 
manufacturing jobs in Latin America?  
 
This paper attempts to provide answers to these questions with a focus on Argentina, 
which experienced a 31 percent decline in industrial employment over the last decade, 
while the share of imports from China and India increased six fold. To do so, we draw 
on a dynamic econometric model where labor demand in each industry is a function 
of wages, the capital stock, prices and productivity. The last two (prices and 
productivity) are a function of import and export penetration, and will allow us to 
identify the impact that trade with China and India is having through these two 
channels on labor demand in Argentina’s manufacturing sector.  
 
In principle, trade should affect the level of employment across and within sectors. 
Empirical research on the impact of trade on employment, has found little evidence 
either way, particularly in developing countries.1 Using plant level data for Morocco, 
Currie and Harrison (1997) find only a small impact of trade liberalization on the 
level of employment. Revenga (1997) did not find any statistically significant relation 
                                                 
1 See Hoekman and Winters (2005) for a comprehensive survey on the recent empirical evidence on the 
effects of trade on employment. 
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between the level of employment and tariffs liberalization in the case of Mexico. 
Márquez and Pages-Serra (1998) examined the relationship between trade 
liberalization and employment in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and could 
not find any substantial effect. A comprehensive study by the IADB (2004), using 
household survey data for 10 LAC countries, did not find a statistically significant 
association between the two phenomena. De Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney 
(2003) confirm this result for several countries in LAC. In a similar study, that also 
contemplates the effects of exchange rate appreciations, Haltiwanger et. al. (2004), 
did not find robust results on the relationship between trade liberalization and changes 
in net employment in the region. In their paper on the impact of trade liberalization on 
income distribution in Colombia, Attanasio et al. (2004) found no evidence of labor 
reallocation across sectors. Similarly small employment effects in Latin America are 
reported in Levinsohn (1999) for Chile, Moreira and Nakberg (2000) for Brazil and 
Gandelman et al. (2005) for Uruguay. 
 
For Argentina, in particular, Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) only found a small 
correlation between trade liberalization and the rate of employment in the nineties. 
Pessino and Andres (2005) attribute the negative effects of trade liberalization on 
employment to the distortions and rigidities of Argentina’s labor market rather than to 
trade liberalization. Sánchez and Buttler (2002) point to other explicative factors 
beyond trade liberalization, such as labor costs, access to credit finance, financial and 
real shocks, informality, etc.  
 
Other studies, such as Altamir and Beccaria (1999), Beckerman (2000), and Damill, 
Frenkel and Mauricio (2002), on the other hand, point to the accelerated process of 
trade liberalization combined with exchange rate appreciation, as the main culprits of 
the net employment loss suffered by the Argentinean manufacturing sector in the last 
decade. In sum, the evidence presented in these studies is not conclusive. In this 
paper, we are not concerned about which policies may have been the cause behind 
that decline, but rather on whether imports from the two rapidly growing Asian 
economies can explain part of this trend.  
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Results suggest that increased trade with China can only explain a negligible share of 
the decline in manufacturing labor demand. Moreover, the increase in overall import 
penetration during the period could only explain a relatively small share of the decline 
in manufacturing employment. To be more precise, a 1 percent increase in import 
penetration leads to a 0.07 percent decline in labor demand. Given that import 
penetration increased by 79 percent over the sample period (1991-2003), the decline 
in labor demand that can be attributed to the increase in import penetration is around 6 
percent. Given that manufacturing employment declined by 31 percent over the 
sample period, the increase in import penetration can at most explain 20 percent of the 
observed loss in manufacturing employment. The other 80 percent had other causes. 
The increased importance of China as a source of imports had an almost negligible 
marginal impact on the decline in labor demand associated with the increase on 
overall imports. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of imports from China, 
leads to an additional 0.02 percent decline in the growth of Argentina’s labor demand. 
Thus, the six-fold increase in the share of imports from China over the period (from 1 
to six percent) could only explain an additional 0.1 to 0.2 percent decline in labor 
demand. Moreover, an increase in the share of imports from Brazil of 1 percentage 
point would have a marginal impact that is twice as large, which arguably is still very 
small. Perhaps more worrying, the small negative impact on employment of increased 
imports from China and Brazil is concentrated in unskilled labor-intensive sectors. 
Results for India, the European Union and the United States suggest that an increase 
in the share of imports from these countries do not have an impact on labor demand 
(beyond the overall impact of import penetration on labor demand). Increases in 
exports do not seem to have an impact on manufacturing employment regardless of 
their destination, with the exception of the Indian market.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized 
facts of Argentina’s trade liberalization and trade with China and India, as well as the 
evolution of manufacturing employment. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and 
the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Stylized facts 
There has been a continuous decline in manufacturing employment in Argentina since 
the early 1980s. Between 1991 and 2003 industrial employment declined by 31 
percent.2 Losses in industrial employment were only partially compensated by an 
increase in employment in the services sector. The net effect on overall employment 
was negative; that resulted in two-digit unemployment rates over most of the period. 
It is only from 2003 onwards that manufacturing employment has experienced a 
recovery. 
 
Simultaneously, the aggregate productivity of the industrial sector increased an 
average of 6.8 percent for 1991-1999. Productivity increased most in capital-intensive 
sectors such as iron and steel, electric machinery and transport equipment and least in 
natural resources and labor-intensive sub-sectors. 3
 
In parallel to these changes in the aggregate level of industrial employment, Argentina 
experienced a deep and accelerated process of trade liberalization.4 The trade-
openness coefficient (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP) went from 6 
percent in 1993 to 23.4 percent in 2001, falling to 21.7 percent in 2003 as a result of 
the economic collapse of Argentina in 2002. Imports as percent of GDP increased 
from 9 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 2001, and fall to 8 percent in 2003. Exports as 
percent of the GDP augmented from 7 percent to 12 percent over the period. 5 For the 
manufacturing industry, in particular, import penetration increased by almost 79 
percent from 1991 to 2003.  
 
                                                 
2 More dramatically, the manufacturing employment level in 2003 was only 47 percent of its level in 
1980. 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the Argentine industrial employment see Altimir and 
Beccaria (1999), and Beccaria, Altimir and Gonzalez Rosada (2003). Dussel Peters (2004) offers a 
comparative analysis with Mexico and Brazil. 
4 See Berlinski (2004) for a detailed account of the Argentinean trade liberalization process in the 
1990s. 
5 These indicators were calculated with data retrieved from ECLAC (2004) 
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As shown in Table 1, changes in import penetration and share in the industry’s total 
employment varied significantly across manufacturing sub-sectors in the nineties. 
However, a clear pattern does not seem to emerge by simply looking at the evoluation 
of these two variables. For instance, sectors such as textile, apparel and footwear 
experience similar increases in import penetration over the period, but the first two 
sectors saw their share of total manufacturing employment decline, whereas footwear 
experience and above average increase in its share of manufacturing employment. 
More generally, while import penetration increased for all manufacturing sub-sectors 
in 1991-2003 relative to 1980-1991, only half of these sub-sectors experienced a 
contraction in their share in total industrial employment.6 This prima-facie evidence 
suggests disentangling the impact that imports had on employment may not be 
straightforward.  
 
The growing importance of China and India as a trading partner is a relatively new 
phenomenon for Argentina. Figure 2a shows that imports from China, and to a lesser 
extent India, have started representing a non-negligible share of Argentina’s imports 
only in the mid-1990s. Though the share of China in Argentina’s total imports 
remained relatively low, it increased almost six-fold between 1990 and 2003. 
Likewise India’s share increased almost seven-fold. Figure 2b reports the same 
information for Argentina’s main trade partners: Brazil, the European Union (EU) and 
the United States.7
 
The already small share of imports sourced in China in total imports declined severely 
as a result of Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001 and only recovered from 2003 
on. Imports from India were not an important share of total imports over the entire 
period. Only from 2002 onwards, imports originated in India have amounted to more 
than 1 percent of total imports.  
 
                                                 
6 In some sectors (i.e. miscellaneous petroleum products and fabricated metal products) the 
employment contraction is mostly explained by the radical process of privatization underwent by 
Argentina’s public sector in the nineties. 
7 These three countries accounted for almost 70 percent of Argentina’s imports during the period 1980-
2003. 
 6
On the other hand, trade with China and India is mostly of an inter-industry nature 
(that is, trade of goods between different industry classifications) as pointed by very 
low intra-industry trade indicators.8 At the same time, both imports and exports from 
and to these markets are extremely concentrated in a few products. 9 This suggests 
that the potential for across sector reallocation of labor could be important. 
 
Thus, it is important to capture these trends at the industry level. Table 2 shows 
information on China’s import penetration for 28 manufacturing industries between 
1980 and 2003. In the nineties, China’s import penetration was concentrated in a few 
sectors, mostly capital-intensive, such as electric and non-electric machinery, 
scientific and professional instruments and other manufactures. These sub-sectors are 
the ones facing more competition from imports from all sources not only from China. 
Some labor-intensive sectors such as leather, and furniture also faced relatively higher 
import competition from China. 
 
Likewise Table 3 describes import competition from India. Although import 
competition from India increased slightly in the nineties vis-à-vis previous decades, it 
remained at very low levels. In fact, with the exception of industrial chemicals, 
imports from India represented less than 1 percent of Argentina’s output. 
 
To summarize, the prima-facie evidence regarding the impact of increases on import 
penetration on employment in Argentina is mixed. Moreover, the rapid growth in 
imports from China and India is even less likely to have had a significant impact 
given that they still represent a small share of Argentina’s imports. 
 
However, this quick look at the data does not obviously imply causality, and can be 
misleading. It would be misleading if, for example, there is correlation between the 
                                                 
8 For instance, Castro et.al. (2005) report a Grubel-Lloyd (GL) Coefficient of 0.01 for Argentina-China 
trade in 2003 (and similar or lower figures for previous years). India displays similar values. The GL 
coefficient is a statistical indicator of the extent of intra-industry trade (IIT) with the world or a partner 
within an industry or the whole. The GL coefficient ranges from 1 to 0. A GL coefficient equal to 1 
means that all trade in that trade flow is of on intra-industry nature; a GL equal to 0 that trade is purely 
inter-industry. See Fontaigne and Freudenberg (1997) for a complete explanation of the GL coefficient 
and its variants. 
9 Castro et.al. (2005), op. cit.  
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evolution of import penetration and import shares from China and India with other 
forces that had a significant impact on manufacturing employment in Argentina. It 
would also be misleading in the presence of reverse causality: import penetration is 
increasing because employment is declining. To try to identify the role-played by 
trade and the growth of Argentina’s trade with China and India we turn to a more 
formal empirical model that will help us address these issues.  
 
3. The model and the empirical strategy  
In order to estimate the impact of changes on import penetration on labor demand, we 
follow Greenway et. al. (1998), and assume a Cobb-Douglas production function 
across industry and time: 
βα
itititit lkAq =       (1) 
 
where q is real output, k is capital stock, l are units of labor employed, and A is a 
Hicks-neutral productivity term; βα and are the share of each factor used in total 
output. We further assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive. Solving the 
first order condition for labor yields: 
 
itititit wqpl /β=      (2) 
 
where p is the domestic price of the good i and w is the labor wage. Replacing (1) in 
(2) and rearranging the equation yields the following expression:  
 
itititit wlAkpl ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= βαβ     (3) 
 
We then solve (3) for labor demand of industry i at time t: 
 
( ) ( )βαβ −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧=
11
itAk ititit wpl     (4) 
 
In contrast to Greenaway et.al (1998), we do not condition labor demand on output 
but on the capital stock. Thus, we allow output to vary following changes in domestic 
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prices associated with changes in trade liberalization. This may be an important 
channel through which trade affects the level of employment at the industry level. 
One would expect the impact of import penetration on labor demand to be larger 
when conditioning on capital rather than on output, as the former allows for the 
adjustment of output as import penetration changes. By conditioning labor demand on 
output, the only channel left for changes in import penetration to affect employment is 
through its impact on total factor productivity (TFP). This is likely to be positive, as it 
reduces x-inefficiencies, less efficient firms exit and more efficient firms become 
larger in the industry. By conditioning on capital, we allow imports to affect 
employment through changes in both TFP and domestic prices leading to changes in 
output.  
 
More formally, we assume that  is a function of import and export penetration: itit pA
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )XMi
itit
T
it XMeAp
ηληλλ 11 210 ++= , 0,, 210 〉λλλ   (5) 
 
where T is a time trend, M is a measure of import penetration, X is a measure of 
export penetration,  is the import demand elasticity, and  is the export supply 
elasticity.  
Mη Xη
 
Whilst  is negative and therefore an increase in imports will decrease pMη it (and 
therefore employment) through this channel,  is positive and therefore an increase 
in exports will increase p
Xη
it (and consequently employment) through this conduit.  
Replacing equation (5) into (4) and taking logs, yields: 
 
εαααααα ++++++= TXMwKl ititititit 543210 lnlnlnlnln  (6) 
 
Equation (6) is the basis for our empirical model using both industry and time 
dummies. Time dummies capture not only the time trend of the productivity 
parameter, but also any general liberalization program that would have occurred (an 
overall 10 percent cut in tariffs) or increase in tariffs for that matter, as well as the 
impact of changes in the exchange rate or any other macroeconomic shock, such as 
 9
the 2001 crisis. Industry dummies capture industry particularities, such as the fact that 
some of the industries (petroleum products) were subject to significant privatization 
during the 1990s. So the estimates refer to the within industry impact of trade 
liberalization on industry employment, controlling for macroeconomic shocks and the 
general equilibrium effects of a general trade liberalization with year dummies. 
 
Because we are interested in the impact that Argentina’s trade with China and India 
had on manufacturing employment, we also add to equation (6), their share of total 
imports and exports, as well as the import and export share of Argentina’s three main 
trading partners (Brazil, the European Union, and the United States) to capture the 
marginal impact associated with trade with different partners. Finally, we also 
examine whether unskilled labor tends to be relatively more affected by interacting 
unskilled and skilled labor dummies with the trade shares.  
 
3.1. Empirical Strategy 
There are two problems with the estimation of equation (6) that can bias our 
estimates. First, labor demand is likely to show inertia, and this may lead to first-order 
serial correlation in the errors. Second, wages and capital stocks are potentially 
endogenous variables (although theoretically we have treated them as exogenous).  
 
We address the potential serial correlation of the error term by including lagged 
employment as an explanatory variable, and testing for first and second order 
correlation of the error term after introducing the lagged dependent variable. This also 
provides us with long run elasticity estimates. However, as shown in the mainstream 
literature (see Kiviet, 1995), the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a panel 
setting also leads to biased and inconsistent estimates when using ordinary-least-
squares. Thus, we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) and estimate a system GMM 
using STATA’s xtabond2 command.10  
 
We address the second problem by using the first, second and third lagged values of 
wage and capital, as instruments for wages and capital stocks; and the first, second 
                                                 
10 See Roodman (2005). 
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and third lagged values of our additional instruments: a proxy for transportation costs, 
sector value added, and the share of low-skilled labor in each industry.11
 
4. Results 
Table 4 reports the estimates of equation (6) using a System GMM, but also the 
output-constrained model as in Greenaway et al. (1998). The capital-constrained 
model results reported in the first column of Table 5 has the expected signs; wages 
and capital are statistically significant at 1 percent, as well as the lagged dependent 
variable.12 Capital seems to have a complementary effect on employment, as 
indicated by the positive sign of its coefficient.13 Import penetration is highly 
significant at the 5 percent level. According to these results, a 1-percentage point 
increase in import penetration tends to reduce employment by 0.084 percent in the 
short run and 0.15 percent in the long run. Export penetration has a positive, but 
statistically insignificant coefficient. 
 
The second column reports the results of the model where estimates are conditional on 
output, and again all coefficients have the expected signs. Interestingly, the estimated 
coefficient on import penetration is 60 percent smaller than in the case of the model 
conditional on capital. Note, however, that they are not statistically different from 
each other. 
 
Note that the HO hypothesis of no second order serial correlation of the error term 
cannot be rejected in both regressions, and the HO hypothesis of no over-
identification needs to be rejected. This suggests that there is no evidence that our 
estimates are biased due to serial correlation of the error term, or lack of identification 
in our regressions. 
 
Table 5 reports the System GMM estimations only for the capital-constrained 
specification, but including trade shares by partner, in order to assess the marginal 
                                                 
11 See Data Appendix for a description of the methodology and statistical information used for the 
construction of each variable.  
12 Our estimates for wages and lagged employment are within the range of estimates obtained for other 
countries in the region using similar specifications. See Hamermesh (2004). There he provides a 
summary of the results of the existing econometric studies on trade and changes in the derived static 
and dynamic labour demand in Latin America. 
13 See Hammermesh (1993) 
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impact of imports and exports with different trading partners. The coefficients on 
lagged employment, wage and capital stock show the expected signs and are highly 
significant, and stable throughout specifications. The total import penetration 
coefficient is always negative and significant around the 1 to 5 percent threshold. As 
shown, an increase of 1 percentage point in total import penetration generates a job 
loss of around 0.07 percent. Given that import penetration increased by 79 percent 
over the sample period (1991-2003), the decline in labor demand that can be 
attributed to the increase in import penetration is around 6 percent in the short run and 
10 percent in the long run. Given that manufacturing employment declined by 31 
percent over the sample period (1980-2003), the increase in import penetration can at 
most explain 32 percent of the observed loss in manufacturing employment. The 
coefficient on Total Exports/Consumption shows the expected sign, but it is not 
statistically significant. 
 
The last two columns explore the marginal impact on employment of imports and 
exports with China, India and Argentina’s three main trading partners. In the case of 
China, the coefficient on imports is negative and significant at the 5 percent level in 
both columns. This implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1 percentage point in 
the share of Chinese imports generates a decrease in labor demand of around 0.02 
percent (and around 0.04 percent in the long run). Thus, the six-fold increase in the 
share of imports from China over the period (from 1 to six percent) could explain an 
almost negligible 0.1 to 0.2 percent additional decline in labor demand. Interestingly, 
an increase in the share of imports from Brazil of 1 percentage point would have an 
impact that is twice as large, which arguably is still very small. Imports from India, or 
the European Union and the United States do not appear to have any additional impact 
on employment levels. Exports to different trading partners do not seem to have any 
additional impact on employment, except for exports to India, but its economic 
significance is negligible. Again, all four regressions in Table 5 cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the error term and reject the null 
hypothesis of no over-identification.   
 
Table 6 reports the results for the third column in Table 5, but exploring for 
heterogeneity across industries’ labor-skill intensity. Results suggest that the marginal 
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(and small) additional impact of imports from both China and Brazil is concentrated 
in low-skill intensive industries. In the case of China, an increase of 1 percentage 
point in its import share leads to a decline in the employment of unskilled-intensive 
sectors of around 0.02 percent. The effect is again twice as large for Brazil. In 
contrasts, high-skilled sectors seem not to be affected by imports sourced from either 
China or Brazil. Again, the over-identification and the second order serial correlation 
tests do not suggest that there are problems with this regression. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the last decade, import penetration in Argentina’s manufacturing sector 
increased by 79 percent, while imports from China and India increased six-fold, and 
manufacturing employment declined by 33 percent. Many believed that the sharp 
decline in employment was mainly due to the rapidly growing imports from the two 
Asian economies. A more careful look suggests that the evidence is mixed at best. 
Total import competition increased significantly across sectors but manufacturing 
employment (measured as a share of total employment in the industry) decline for 
some sub-sectors and increased for others. With the exception of apparel and 
footwear, employment did not decline in sectors where China and India had a 
significant and growing share of Argentina’s imports. Moreover, the two Asian 
economies still only account for less than 6 percent of Argentina’s import bundle. 
 
In order to take a more careful look at whether imports from China and India are 
responsible for the decline in manufacturing employment in Argentina, we develop a 
dynamic econometric model, where import penetration and export penetration can 
affect the level of employment through their impact on domestic prices and 
productivity, while controlling for industry and time effects.  
 
Results suggest that the rapid increase in import penetration in Argentina’s 
manufacturing employment can only explain a small fraction (20 percent) of the large 
decline in manufacturing employment observed during the period. Imports from 
China had a slightly larger impact on manufacturing employment than imports from 
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the rest of the world, probably due to the fact that China is a relatively labor abundant 
country. However, the marginal impact of imports from Brazil is twice as large as 
imports from China, although economically still insignificant. Imports from India or 
Argentina’s other two main trading partners (the European Union and the United 
States) do not seem to have any additional marginal impact (beyond the impact of 
import penetration) on manufacturing employment.   
 
Imports from both China and India tend to impose larger declines on the level of 
employment in unskilled-intensive sectors, although again the marginal effect on 
unskilled employment of imports from Brazil is twice as large as imports from China. 
Again, imports from other sources do not have a statistically significant impact when 
exploring the heterogeneity across skilled and unskilled intensive industries.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, exports do not seem to contribute to manufacturing 
employment. The coefficient on export penetration is always positive, but never 
statistically so. Moreover, even if they were statistically significant, the magnitude of 
the impact is rather small, given the estimated coefficients. This holds regardless of 
the export destination, with the exception of India, but again the magnitude is 
negligible. This suggests that increases in exports are not accompanied by increases in 
manufacturing employment.  
 
To conclude, the decline in Argentina’s manufacturing employment can only 
marginally be attributed to import competition from China and India, or from any 
other source for that matter. The “mighty giants” that could explain this decline are to 
be found somewhere else.  
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Data Appendix: Sources and variable construction 
Our main source is the UNIDO INDSTAT Database of Industrial Statistics at the 3-
digit, ISIC Revision 2 nomenclature. It comprises output, wages, employment and 
value added data for 28 manufacturing sectors, covering the years 1980-2003. The 
latter was used as an instrument in our estimations. All variables (except for the 
number of employed people) were converted to 1976 constant dollars using a GDP 
deflator retrieved from the US BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
 
In addition, we computed an initial capital stock using the ECLAC-PADI database, 
adjusted later using (scarce) gross fixed investment data found in the UNIDO 
database, applying the permanent inventory method. Trade data was gathered from 
UN COMTRADE and then converted to 1976 constant dollars, except for transport 
costs, later used as an additional instrument in our econometric estimations. We 
calculated freight costs per mile using US Imports data from Argentina, gathered from 
US ITC and BLS sources. Then, we computed total freight costs multiplying freight 
costs per mile by each trading partner’s distance to Argentina using the CEPII 
distance database. Finally, we applied a simple average in order to avoid collinearity 
issues with other explanatory variables.   
 
Another variable of interest used as instrument in our estimations is the share of 
unskilled workers by industrial sector. This was gathered from INDEC (National 
Institute of Statistics and Census), using all household surveys (EPH) available for 
Greater Buenos Aires. Any person with unfinished secondary education or less was 
considered low skilled throughout the whole sample. Since we found some gaps in the 
data, missing years were filled with the averages of immediate passed and future 
observations, since it is highly unlikely to encounter sudden structural changes in the 
skill intensity of each industry from one year to another.  
 
 
 
 
 18
Summary of Data: Available years and Sources 
 
ititit
it
p
it
p
MXQ
MnPenetratio +−=
Variable Years  Sources 
Output   
Employment 1980-2003 UNIDO INDSTAT Database 
Wages  
Value Added 
Capital Stock 1980-2003 ECLAC-PADI / UNIDO 
INDSTAT 
  US ITC (International Trade 
Commission), BLS (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics), CEPII distance 
database, UN COMTRADE 
Transport Cost 1991-2003 
Imports and Exports 1980-2003 UN COMTRADE 
Share of Low Skill Workers 1980,1982,1985,1987,1988,
1990-2003 
INDEC (National Institute of 
Statistics and Census) – EPH – 
Greater Buenos Aires 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
1. Total Import Penetration:  Total Import penetration for sector i in year t is 
defined by the ratio between Imports (M) from a specific partner p (in our case the 
World) and apparent consumption, calculated as 
 
      
    
 
Where Consumption is the expression found in the denominator. Accordingly, 
Consumption equals Output (Q) plus Total Imports (M) minus Total Exports (X) for 
each manufacturing sector i and year t. 
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 2. Total Exports / Consumption: Total Exports / Consumption ratio for sector i in 
year t is defined by the ratio between Exports (X) from a specific partner p (in our 
case the World) and Consumption 
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3. Share of Imports by trading partner: is the ratio of imports M from partner p 
and Total Imports for each manufacturing sector i and year t. 
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4. Share of Exports by trading partner: is the ratio of exports X to  partner p and 
Total Exports for each manufacturing sector i and year t. 
 
 
∑=
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p
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p
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pX
X
Xs , 
 
 
5. Low / High Skill: Low (High) Skill is a dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of 1 when a particular sector i in year t has a lower (higher) share of Low (High) 
Skilled workers compared to the industry average. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Employment in the Argentine Industrial Sector, 1980-2003 (thousands of workers) 
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Figure 2a: Share of Argentine Imports from China and India, 1980-2003  
Source: UN COMTRADE (2005) 
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Figure 2b: Share of Argentine Imports from Brazil, EU and USA, 1980-2003  
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Table 1: Total Import Penetration and Changes in Industry’s Share in Total Industrial 
Employment, Percent and Averages 
ISIC Industry Description 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2003 
Changes in 
Industry’s 
Share in 
Total 
Industrial 
Employment 
1991-03 
311 Food products 1.0% 3.8% 2.7% 21.79% 
313 Beverages 0.7% 1.6% 0.5% 57.26% 
314 Tobacco 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 25.58% 
321 Textiles 1.7% 12.4% 11.7% -24.83% 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 1.2% 6.5% 4.2% -3.18% 
323 Leather products 0.9% 12.0% 11.3% 26.14% 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.8% 10.7% 6.0% 60.55% 
331 Wood products, except furniture 8.2% 16.4% 12.3% -21.45% 
332 Furniture, except metal 0.2% 11.4% 18.0% 6.64% 
341 Paper and products 8.2% 19.8% 15.9% 22.18% 
342 Printing and publishing 1.9% 4.2% 2.8% 29.20% 
351 Industrial chemicals 24.2% 40.0% 41.7% -19.20% 
352 Other chemicals 6.0% 12.4% 13.0% 31.87% 
353 Petroleum refineries 1.7% 5.4% 4.9% 4.55% 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 5.8% 25.9% 28.0% -92.83% 
355 Rubber products 4.3% 28.8% 33.5% 1.69% 
356 Plastic products 2.6% 12.5% 8.2% 64.30% 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 2.0% 13.8% 13.1% -74.63% 
362 Glass and products 5.0% 18.5% 15.5% -8.14% 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 3.9% 5.3% 3.3% -54.09% 
371 Iron and steel 14.5% 16.2% 29.7% -35.58% 
372 Non-ferrous metals 19.7% 29.5% 33.1% -16.16% 
381 Fabricated metal products 3.8% 16.1% 14.6% -37.68% 
382 Machinery, except electrical 28.8% 55.3% 45.7% 21.46% 
383 Machinery, electric 23.0% 49.0% 48.2% 5.96% 
384 Transport equipment 7.6% 35.5% 44.2% -27.54% 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 43.7% 61.8% 70.9% -4.52% 
390 Other manufactured products 23.8% 60.3% 55.3% -18.61% 
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2004) and UNCOMTRADE (2005) 
 
 
Table 2: Import Penetration from China, Percent and Averages 
ISIC Industry description 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2003 
311 Food products 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 
313 Beverages 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
314 Tobacco 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
321 Textiles 0.07% 0.65% 0.36% 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.02% 0.82% 1.25% 
323 Leather products 0.01% 4.77% 5.30% 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.01% 0.56% 1.85% 
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.00% 0.22% 0.23% 
332 Furniture, except metal 0.00% 0.36% 1.13% 
341 Paper and products 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 
342 Printing and publishing 0.00% 0.09% 0.08% 
351 Industrial chemicals 0.05% 0.63% 1.50% 
352 Other chemicals 0.01% 0.15% 0.14% 
353 Petroleum refineries 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
355 Rubber products 0.00% 0.45% 0.97% 
356 Plastic products 0.01% 0.98% 0.71% 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.06% 3.13% 2.95% 
362 Glass and products 0.00% 0.44% 0.76% 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 
371 Iron and steel 0.00% 0.14% 0.93% 
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.00% 0.15% 0.57% 
381 Fabricated metal products 0.02% 0.86% 1.19% 
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.01% 1.17% 2.94% 
383 Machinery, electric 0.02% 2.21% 4.75% 
384 Transport equipment 0.02% 0.31% 0.64% 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 0.14% 2.10% 3.64% 
390 Other manufactured products 0.56% 10.51% 13.88% 
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2004) and UNCOMTRADE (2005) 
Notes: in bold are import penetration coefficients higher than 1% 
 24
Table 3: Indian Imports Penetration, Percent and Averages 
ISIC Industry description 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2003
311 Food products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
313 Beverages 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
314 Tobacco 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
321 Textiles 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 
323 Leather products 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
332 Furniture, except metal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
341 Paper and products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
342 Printing and publishing 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
351 Industrial chemicals 0.0% 0.4% 1.3% 
352 Other chemicals 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
353 Petroleum refineries 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
355 Rubber products 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
356 Plastic products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
362 Glass and products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
371 Iron and steel 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
381 Fabricated metal products 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
383 Machinery, electric 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
384 Transport equipment 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
390 Other manufactured products 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2004) and UNCOMTRADE (2005).  
Notes: in bold are import penetration coefficients higher than 1% 
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Table 4 
Employment  (1) (3) 
  Capital Output  
  constrained constrained 
    
Employment (-1)  0.456 0.187 
  (0.052)***  (0.037)*** 
Wage   -0.279 -0.28 
  (0.040)***  (0.024)*** 
Capital or Output  0.222 0.624 
  (0.039)***  (0.059)*** 
Total Import Penetration  -0.084 -0.050 
  (0.033)**  (0.022)** 
Total Export Penetration  0.007 0.029 
  (0.019)  (0.013)** 
Constant  3.397 1.424 
  (1.390)**  (1.051) 
    
Hansen J-Statistic / Sargan  0.0 0.07 
2nd Order AC Test (p-value)  0.63 0.80 
Time and Sector Dummies included in all regressions but not reported Robust 
Standard Error in Parenthesis. (***): Significant at 1%; (**): Significant at 5%; 
(*): Significant at 10% System GMM correspond to one step estimation 
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable: Employment     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employment (-1) 0.493 0.459 0.453 0.456 
 (0.0536)*** (0.0558)*** (0.513)*** (0.048)*** 
Wage  -0.276 -0.276 -0.281 -0.295 
 (0.0388)*** (0.0388)*** (0.0453)*** (0.047)*** 
Capital 0.238 0.218 0.230 0.255 
 (0.0414)*** (0.0357)*** (0.415)*** (0.047)*** 
Import Penetration  -0.081 -0.071 -0.067 
  (0.0316)** (0.0333)** (0.032)** 
Share of Imports from China   -0.018 -0.017 
   (0.009)** (0.008)** 
Share of Imports from Brazil   -0.040 -0.038 
   (0.012)** (0.014)*** 
Share of Imports from EU+USA   -0.048 -0.047 
   (0.0282) (0.033) 
Share of Imports from India   0.004 0.001 
   (0.0079) (0.007) 
     
Export Penetration    0.026 
    (0.022) 
Share of Exports to China    0.001 
    (0.003) 
Share of Exports to Brazil    0.009 
    (0.011) 
Share of Exports to EU+USA    0.005 
    (0.005) 
Share of Exports to India    0.017 
    (0.007)** 
Constant 2.687 3.469 3.063 2.464 
 (1.496)* (1.198)*** (1.245)** (1.439)* 
     
Hansen J-Statistic / Sargan 0.02 0.01 0.0 0.0 
2nd Order AC 0.78 0.66 0.77 0.54 
     
Sample: 1991-2003     
Observations: 364     
Notes: Time and Sector Dummies included in all regressions but not reported. Robust 
Standard Error in Parenthesis. (***): Significant at 1%; (**): Significant at 5%; (*): 
Significant at 10% System GMM correspond to one step estimation. 
 
Table 6 
Dependent Variable: Employment  
 (1) 
  
Employment (-1) 0.461 
 (0.062)*** 
Wage  -0.279 
 (0.043)*** 
Capital 0.230 
 (0.039)*** 
Import Penetration -0.071 
 (0.033)* 
Share of Imports from China * Low Skill -0.018 
 (0.010)* 
Share of Imports from China * High Skill -0.016 
 (0.011) 
Share of Imports from Brazil * Low Skill -0.038 
 (0.012)** 
Share of Imports from Brazil * High Skill -0.029 
 (0.035) 
Share of Imports from EU+USA * Low Skill -0.044 
 (0.028) 
Share of Imports from EU+USA * High Skill -0.049 
 (0.045) 
Share of Imports from India * Low Skill 0.004 
 (0.006) 
Share of Imports from India * High Skill 0.005 
 (0.012) 
  
Constant 3.012 
 (1.245)** 
  
Hansen J-Statistic / Sargan 0.0 
2nd Order AC 0.83 
  
Sample: 1991-2003  
Observations: 364  
Notes: Time and Sector Dummies included in all regressions but not 
reported. Robust Standard Error in Parenthesis. (***): Significant at 1%; 
(**): Significant at 5%; (*): Significant at 10% System GMM correspond 
to one step estimation.  
